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1. Introduction 
People frequently cheat or lie, especially to protect their self-interest or self-concept (Ariely, 2012). 
Two basic notions of cheating have been distinguished: On the one hand, people could just maximize 
their monetary outcomes, regardless of whether such an optimization requires lies or cheating. On the 
basis of a cost-benefit calculation, the would-be cheater decides whether to cheat or not (Becker, 
1968). On the other hand, people could be basically honest and dislike lying or cheating, but 
circumstances may tempt them and can lead them to lie or cheat (Mazar et al., 2008). In other words, 
they trade off possible internalized norms or social norms not to lie or cheat (Kant, 1949) with the 
potential benefits (see also Gneezy, 2005; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 
2009; Sutter, 2009; Abeler et al., 2014; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013; 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gibson et al., 2013; Gneezy et al., 2013; Lightle, 2013; Ariely et 
al., 2014). 
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the circumstances that prompt people to cheat, 
keeping the costs and benefits of cheating constant. Such circumstances will be especially important in 
the design of behavioral mechanisms and institutions that reduce the amount or costs of cheating in 
situations involving limited verifiability or monitoring possibilities or in which the latter are (very) 
expensive. Our focus here is on the gain-loss frame (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) of the cheating 
option. We hypothesize that it is perceptionally different to cheat in order to gain a certain advantage 
than to cheat in order to lose a certain advantage, even when the underlying outcome is exactly the 
same. We are not aware of any other studies in the economics literature with a similar research 
question. 
Relevant real-world analogies to such framing differences or reference dependence pertaining to 
cheating readily come to mind. A recurrent example of cheating relates to welfare assistance. It is 
well-known that individuals can lie to benefit from welfare assistance. However, an individual can lose 
welfare benefits if she no longer fulfills the conditions required. Thus, individuals also lie not to lose 
welfare benefits they have been receiving. Recently, “a Shepherd resident who illegally collected more 
than $124,000 in Social Security benefits for himself and his daughter admitted he got greedy and 
dodged agency requests about his employment. (…) Hofmann worked and was paid ‘under the table’ 
to hide his income and to avoid losing benefits [emphasis added] he was receiving from the Social 
Security Administration’. (Billings Gazette, 2009). In the same vein, there is anecdotal evidence that 
people are ready to lie or cheat to gain status, but especially not to lose face or status. A recent 
example is the case of Lance Armstrong who “had to lie about doping to keep winning” (Hall, 2013). 
Based on the distinction between a gain frame and a loss frame, our main hypothesis for our 
empirical assessment is that people are more likely to lie to preserve a certain benefit (or avoid a loss) 
than to acquire it. We devise a laboratory experiment based on a real-effort task (Mazar et al., 2008; 
Gino et al., 2009) that addresses this issue in a 2x2-factorial, between-subject study design. The design 
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varies the factors verifiability (monitoring performance is possible versus it is impossible) and the 
frame (cheating generates a perceptional gain versus it creates a perceptional loss). All other 
determinants are held constant, allowing us to causally assess our main hypothesis. 
The gain-loss frame is introduced in the experiment by means of tangibility of payments. In the 
perceptional gain frame, participants in the experiments are paid according to their (reported) 
performance, after they have finished a certain number of real-effort tasks in a given amount of time. 
In the perceptional loss frame participants receive the maximum possible amount before they start 
with working on the real-effort tasks, knowing that they would have to return any money that they had 
not earned with their (reported) performance. In both cases the performance-based piece rate, i.e. the 
payment per correctly finished real-effort task, is announced in the beginning and common 
knowledge. 
Our experimental results indeed indicate a very strong effect of advance payments. The level of 
cheating is almost doubled under advance payments compared to ex post payments. Since the 
incentive mechanism is linear, this implies that advance payments are about twice as expensive as ex 
post payments in the two conditions that allow for lying. Not surprisingly, the timing of payment has 
no effect at all on performance when monitoring is possible. However, as soon as monitoring is 
credibly made impossible, reported performance increases with ex post payment, but much more so 
with advance payment. We interpret the results in terms of gain-loss framing of payments induced 
through tangibility of payments in the advance payment setting. 
The setup we implement in our real-effort experiment is related to a work environment with 
incomplete contracts and non-verifiability. It provides evidence that the positive view of advance 
payments as a means to increase effort reciprocity (e.g., Fryer et al., 2009) has to be questioned. 
Advance payments under certain circumstances may trigger higher levels of cheating or fraudulent 
behavior. While there is of course evidence on positive reciprocity stemming from advance payments, 
one should be careful in ascribing only positive consequences to them. Obviously, the extent to which 
potential effort-enhancing effects and potential cheating effects of advance payments occur depend on 
the perception of decision makers. Likewise, whether and when potential cheating effects might offset 
incentive effects is an open research question. At least for our setup, we were unable to detect a 
significantly positive incentive effect of advance payments, but we observe a large negative cheating 
effect. 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The following section provides an overview 
of the related literature and formulates our main hypothesis. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy 
that we employ. The fourth section discusses the results of our experiment, and Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
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2. Overview of related literature 
The traditional economic model – in the spirit of Becker (1968) – has assumed that lying or cheating is 
only an issue of maximizing monetary outcomes. People lie or cheat if these actions increase their 
expected utility. However, more recently, a sizeable and quickly growing number of studies have 
addressed several aspects of lying or cheating in an economic context. 
We do not intend to survey the entire literature here (see, for instance, Ariely, 2012; Abeler et al. 
2014); it has been growing quickly over the last couple of years. Most of the economic literature on 
lying and cheating started with an assessment of whether people follow a Beckerian approach (and lie 
to the full extent possible) or whether people moderate the extent of their lying and cheating. Indeed, 
on average, the latter is true, i.e., people do not cheat as much as they can even if they forgo significant 
amounts of money if they remain honest (see, e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2009; Fischbacher and 
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Reasons for restraining one’s cheating and lying are numerous. Abstracting from 
the obvious influence of the detection probability (Rowatt et al., 1998; Lundquist et al., 2009), there 
might be a social norm or an internalized norm not to lie or cheat, and people might experience 
negative emotions when they lie or cheat (Batigalli et al., 2013). If that is the case, people are lying 
averse either of social image concerns or of self-image concerns. The combination of these concerns 
that might strongly depend on the context (think of an individual tax declaration versus a confession in 
front of a catholic priest) determines the extent of lying behavior in combination with an individual’s 
inclination to be honest and truthful.1 Consequently, the next issue in the experimental economics 
literature on lying and cheating was an analysis of the determinants that promote or restrict lying 
behavior. Numerous circumstances that can contribute to a higher propensity of lying have been 
examined. Without purporting to be exhaustive here, the following determinants have been mentioned: 
people lie more when stakes and expected benefits are high (Boles at el., 2000), when the 
characteristics are prone to measurement error (Toma et al., 2008), when the benefits from cheating 
are shared (Wiltermuth, 2011), if people expect not to be believed when they report private 
information in presence of an opportunity (Sutter, 2009), if the context of the lie could play a role 
(Cappelen et al., 2013), when others lie (Gino et al., 2009), and after negative previous experience 
(Houser et al., 2012). 
Regarding our main interest of research, the interaction of gain versus loss frames and the 
inclination to lie, there is a couple of more closely related paper. Cameron and Miller (2009) 
implement an experiment in which anagrams have to be solved. Instead of advance and ex post 
payments they just frame the situation in terms of potential gains or losses; further, the monetary 
incentives were quite low, and they do not analyze the possibility of an interaction between the 
                                                          
1 Sometime lying may even be the norm. Such lies are also called ‘white lies’ (see, e.g., Erat and Gneezy, 2012). In the 
following, we abstract from such lying motives. We also disregard the large literature on promise keeping (e.g., Charness and 
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). 
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gain/loss frame and the possibility to cheat or not. However, their main result is in line with our 
hypothesis, i.e. that the loss frame has a tendency to increase cheating behavior. 
Gravert (2013) provides a link between entitlements and stealing. In her experiment she finds that 
participants who had earned their payoff according to performance were much more likely to take the 
(undeserved) maximum payoff than participants in a random payment scheme. Supposedly, an 
endowment effect has an impact on the inclination to cheat. Linking the endowment effect to 
reference-dependence provides the connection between her study and ours. A similar effect is reported 
for goal-setting in Schweitzer et al. (2004). They found in a laboratory experiment that unmet goals 
lead to a higher rate of unethical behavior. In Jacobsen and Piovesan (2014), a tax frame is combined 
with a cheating option. Expectedly, the tax frame compared to a neutral frame is used as an excuse to 
rationalize cheating behavior. The paper shows that framing is relevant for the degree of cheating, but 
it does not vary the framing over gains and losses. 
Finally, Levitt et al. (2012) implement a field experiment to examine the effect of incentives for 
teachers on performance of students. They found that students trained by teachers who were given the 
bonuses in the beginning of the year obtained better scores than those trained by teachers that received 
the bonuses at the end of the year. In other words, the prospect of losing a reward seems to motivate 
individuals to perform better than the possibility of gaining the same reward after the test ends. In their 
paper, they do not take cheating into account as a potentially detrimental force, but in a previous paper 
by Jacob and Levitt (2003) they note that the "observed frequency of cheating appears to respond 
strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives". 
In the next section, we design an experiment to test whether cheating decisions differ in an 
environment that includes financial incentives framed either as a gain or as a loss. Given that the 
neoclassical cost-benefit result is identical in the two framings, we can detect whether the framing 
influences cheating behavior. 
 
 
3. Experimental design, identification strategy, and 
hypotheses 
We use an experimental design for our real-effort laboratory experiment that has been introduced by 
Mazar et al. (2008). More precisely, we implement a 2 (gain or loss) x 2 (monitored performance or 
unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with a total of 259 experimental participants (see 
Table 1). Individuals in the laboratory are given a sheet of paper with a series of 20 different pairs of 
matrices containing nine non-integer numbers each and are asked to find in each of the pairs two 
numbers that add up to exactly 10 (see the Appendix for an example of a matrix sheet). In written 
instructions (see an example, for our experimental instructions for the cheating condition in the 
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Appendix), participants are told that they have five minutes to solve as many of the pairs as possible 
and that they get paid based on how many they solve correctly. Each correctly solved pair is worth 
1.50 €; this piece rate is clearly stated in the instructions. 
 
Table 1. 2x2-factorial, between-subject experimental design 
 Monitored performance 
(No cheating opportunity) 
Unmonitored performance 
(Cheating opportunity) 
Gain frame (payment ex post; 
according to (self-reported) 
performance) 
T1: Control treatment 
(N=71) 
T3: Level of cheating in gain 
frame 
(N=79) 
Loss frame (payment in advance 
and reimbursement according to 
(self-reported) performance) 
T2: Effect of loss frame on 
performance 
(N=43) 
T4: Level of cheating in loss 
frame 
(N=66) 
Note: N is the number of observations; T stands for Treatment. 
 
People can cheat on the matrix task in the two “cheating conditions” because of a “shredder” 
announced in the beginning. Subjects are asked to count their correct answers on their own and then 
put their work sheets through a paper shredder at the back of the room. They then state to the 
experimenter how many pairs of matrices they solved correctly and get paid accordingly. Regardless 
of whether the shredder condition applied or whether the experimenter could verify the number of 
correctly solved matrices the remuneration for each solved pair was always 1.50 €. After verifying the 
number of solved matrices by the experimenter in the “non-cheating conditions”, the sheets of papers 
were also shredded. 
Our gain frame corresponds to payment of the participants after they solve the matrix task 
according to the number of solved matrices. The loss frame is equivalent to payment of the 
participants in advance, asking for the excess amount to be given back to the experimenter at the end 
of the experiment. In the loss frame, we gave each participant the maximum possible amount of 30 € 
(20 pairs time 1.50 €) in advance in cash. 
Introducing sufficient levels of loss aversion in a standard utility model would immediately 
provide as a theoretical result our main hypothesis, i.e., as indicated earlier, that the gain/loss frame 
will impact cheating behavior. Since the result is obvious, we omit a formal model here. As already 
discussed, we expect to observe a higher (reported) performance in loss-framed treatments than in 
gain-framed treatments. Moreover, as in our setting there are no exogenous costs related to lying (full 
anonymity, no possibility of detection, etc.), the standard prediction is that, when given the 
opportunity to lie, people will take it, as it corresponds to profit maximization: correspondingly, we 
expect the (reported) unmonitored performance to exceed the monitored performance also in the gain 
frame. This prediction would lead to a reported performance of solved matrixes up to the maximum 
(i.e. 20 pairs). However, several papers reported non-maximal levels of lying in comparable 
experimental situations (Mazar at al. 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler et al. 2014), 
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and several theoretical papers (starting with Crawford and Sobel, 1982) argued in favor of a tradeoff 
between psychological costs of lying and monetary benefits. Hence, our expectation is that lying levels 
are, on average, bounded away from the maximum. Our results could also be gender-dependent. 
Several experimental studies report women to be more honest than men (Dreber and Johannesson, 
2008; Houser et al., 2012). However, such a gender effect could be modulated by gender-sensitive 
performance in and gender-specific implications of the task and, thus, the direction of the overall 
effect is an empirical question. 
To sum up, we test the following three main hypotheses in our experiment: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher performance will be self-reported in loss frames as compared to 
gain frames. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A higher unmonitored performance will be reported than the actual 
monitored performance both in the gain frame and the loss frame. Yet, the self-reported 
unmonitored performance will not be at the maximum. 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher performance will be self-reported by men as compared to women. 
 
By comparing performance in T1 and T2, we are able to explore whether a loss frame in itself 
improves monitored performance ceteris paribus, as indicated by parts of the previous literature. By 
comparing the level of cheating between T3 and T4, we are able to evaluate to what extent a loss 
frame pushes people to behave more dishonestly than the gain frame. This will fully test Hypothesis 1. 
By comparing performance in T3 versus T1 and T4 versus T2 we test Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 will 
be tested for all our treatments. 
The experiment was conducted in the LESSAC laboratory in Dijon in September and October 
2012. A total number of 259 subjects from various academic backgrounds were recruited via ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004). Subjects remained anonymous throughout the experiment, and cash payments were 
made privately. Gender of our subjects is recorded by the experimenter when paying them. An 
experimental session lasted for about 30 minutes, on average. Subjects earned an average of € 8.60 (in 
LESSAC, show-up fees are not commonly used). Importantly, all sessions have been conducted by the 
same female experimenter. 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
We start by looking at the main treatment effects. Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of our 
results. First, it is worthwhile noting that we do not find a significant different between ex ante and ex 
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post payment with monitored performance (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test; p = 0.89). If you want, 
there is no additional motivational effect of putting ex-ante money on the table in our setting. 
 
Table 2. Number of pairs of matrices (reported as) solved 
 Monitored performance 
(No cheating opportunity) 
Unmonitored performance 
(Cheating opportunity) 
Gain frame (payment ex post; 
according to performance) 
3.93 
(2.46) 
5.42 
(4.29) 
 
Loss frame (payment in advance 
and reimbursement according to 
(self-reported) performance) 
4.00 
(2.83) 
9.56 
(6.75) 
Note: Standard deviation in brackets.  
 
Second, we observe a considerable extent of cheating. This is perfectly in line with the literature. 
Comparing the gain frame under monitored and unmonitored performance, we obtain an increase in 
the number of pairs of matrices (reported as) solved of about 38% from 3.93, on average, to 5.42 (two-
sided Mann-Whitney-U-test; p = 0.02). Our design allows us to interpret the difference as the 
consequence of cheating by our participants. However, the most important comparison for our study is 
between monitored and unmonitored performance in the loss frame. Here the increase in the number 
of pairs of matrices (reported as) solved is far more than 100%. The difference between 4.00 and 9.56 
matrices, on average, is highly significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test; p < 0.001). 
Finally, it immediately clear that the frame also matters in the unmonitored conditions, i.e. when 
there is an opportunity to cheat. While the increase in performance from the gain to the loss frame is 
negligible with monitoring, it is strong without monitoring. The reported number of solved matrices 
rises from 5.42 to 9.56, on average. The difference is highly significant (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-
test; p < 0.001). Since we control for all relevant confounds, the average differences can only be 
attributed to differences in the extent of cheating by our participants in the real-effort task. 
It is also interesting to look at the distributions of the reported number of matrices solved (see 
Figure 1). Whereas very few participants solve more than ten matrices under monitoring, many people 
report ten to 20 solved matrices under no monitoring. Interestingly, only about 7% of the participants 
report the maximum performance of 20 solved matrices in the ex ante payment treatment without 
monitoring. Thus, we confirm results from previous studies (e.g., Föllmi-Heusi and Fischbacher, 
2013) which imply that few people lie to the full possible extent (maximizing their payoffs). Instead, 
on average, they choose levels of performance that do not seem outrageous. Whether this behavior is 
due to self-image concerns, social image concerns, or uncertain beliefs regarding the experimenter’s 
response to outrageous performance reports, is an interesting question that cannot be answered in our 
setup. 
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Figure 2. Number of pairs of matrices (reported as) solved – distribution 
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Result 1 (related to Hypothesis 1): Cheating is significantly more often observed in the 
loss frame than in the gain frame: (self-reported) performance increases from 5.42 to 9.56 
solved matrices. 
 
Result 2 (related to Hypothesis 2): Without monitoring, the self-reported performance is 
significantly higher than the actual performance both in the gain and in the loss frame. 
However, cheating is not going to the maximal, payoff-maximizing level. 
 
We now address potential gender effects, stressing that the analysis is exploratory. Table 3 
provides an overview of averages. Women's actual performance under monitoring is slightly positively 
affected by the framing going from the gain to the loss frame, while men's real performance is slightly 
negatively affected. This result is consistent with previous studies on women perceiving advance 
payments as a signal of trust and reciprocating trust more (see, for instance, Aguiar et al., 2009), but 
the magnitudes in our setup are not very large. 
The effect of a loss frame on reported performance seems stronger for men than for women (for 
men, we observe an increase from 5.50 to 11.94, while for women the increase only goes from 5.24 to 
6.87). Indeed, the difference is insignificant for females (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test; p > 0.35), 
but highly significant for males (two-sided Mann-Whitney-U-test; p < 0.01). Whether this gender 
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difference in response to the framing is a consequence of the task that seems to be easier for men than 
for women is a question that cannot be answered here. There are other explanations for the gender 
effect, but none of them is entirely convincing. For instance, women could be less loss averse than 
men, but if there is at all a gender difference in loss aversion in lottery decisions, it seems to go in the 
opposite direction (Schmidt and Traub, 2002). It is impossible to rule out – not only in our experiment, 
but in any comparable cheating experiment – that the participants perceive a certain risk that 
outrageous claims will not be accepted by the experimenter. If that is the case different risk attitudes 
between males and females would be an explanation for the observed gender differences. It is 
probably not necessary to add here that we did everything to credibly signal to our participants that all 
claims will be accepted. Similarly, the specific task might induce males and females to form different 
beliefs over the expectations regarding performance held by the experimenter. Again, formally these 
expectations should not matter at all, but it is impossible to control for the perception of participants in 
our setup. 
 
Table 3. Number of pairs of matrices reported as solved 
 Monitored 
performance 
(all) 
Monitored 
performance 
FEMALE 
Monitored 
performance 
MALE 
Unmonitored 
performance 
(all) 
Unmonitored 
performance 
FEMALE 
Unmonitored 
performance 
MALE 
Gain frame  3.93 3.09 (34) 4.70 (37) 5.42 5.24 (42) 5.50 (36) 
Loss frame  4 3.58 (26) 4.65 (17) 9.56 6.87 (31) 11.94 (35) 
Note: In bold, same information (averages) as in Table 2. Number of observations in parentheses. Gender information is 
missing for one observation. 
 
 
Result 3 (related to Hypothesis 3): Males respond much stronger to the framing in the 
unmonitored conditions than females. 
 
All our non-parametric results are supported when using Tobit regression that takes the censoring 
of the dependent variable, the (self-reported) number of solved pairs of matrices, into account.2 Table 
4 gives the results of three models, one for females only, one for males only, and one for both genders, 
introducing the appropriate dummy variables. The coefficients reveal that both genders cheat when it 
is possible (under no monitoring), but the extent of cheating is higher for men than for women. As 
already discussed above, males react much more strongly to the gain/loss frame than females. In 
contrast to the non-parametric results, the frame has a weakly significant impact on the performance of 
females, but the interaction effect of the frame with the monitoring condition is still insignificant. 
 
Table 4. Tobit regression explaining the (self-reported) number of pairs of matrices solved 
                                                          
2 OLS regressions provide qualitatively the same results and the same levels of significance. 
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(Self-reported) number of pairs of matrices solved Female Male All 
Female - - -5.64*** 
   (1.17) 
Gain frame -1.69* -7.13*** -7.06*** 
 (1.03) (1.21) (1.13) 
Monitoring possible -3.44*** -7.88*** -7.82*** 
 (1.16) (1.50) (1.39) 
Gain frame × Monitoring possible 1.24 7.19*** 7.11*** 
 (1.54) (1.91) (1.77) 
Female × Gain frame - - 5.36*** 
   (1.59) 
Female × Monitoring possible - - 4.36** 
   (1.87) 
Female × Gain frame × Monitoring possible - - -5.86** 
   (2.43) 
Constant 6.83*** 12.53*** 12.47*** 
 (0.78) (0.87) (0.81) 
Log likelihood -363.20 -350.50 -718.85 
No. of observations 133 (120 unsc.) 125 (111 unsc.) 258 (231 unsc.) 
Notes: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Unsc. = uncensored. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We have shown that ethical decision making is vulnerable to the powers of framing. Many people lie 
more to avoid a loss than to acquire a similar gain. Interestingly, men react much more to the framing 
than women. There are at least two mutually non-exclusive rationales that can explain why we observe 
such a strong framing effect in our experiment. First, the loss frame (advance payments) can provide 
individuals with a construal that makes them feel entitled to the money received at the beginning. 
Indeed, dishonest behavior could be just a way to protect this entitlement, making dishonesty more 
acceptable than in the gain frame condition. In other words, the money provided in advance serves as a 
reference point that is higher than the reference point of participants in the gain frame. In line with 
prospect theory and given that dishonesty is frequently viewed as risky behavior, individuals in the 
loss frame (gain frame) are more likely to act risk-seeking (risk averse) (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; see also Brewer and Kramer, 1986), i.e. they cheat more. Formally, though, there was no risk 
involved in our experiment. 
A second rationale relates to the insight that seeking to avoid a loss could make an unethical 
decision more acceptable not only by the individual but also by third parties. If the norm of not 
cheating is less strict in the loss domain, many lying aversion models would predict more lying under 
losses than under gains. One emotional reason for such an asymmetry could be a reduced level of guilt 
felt, when lying under losses than when lying under gains. Somewhat relatedly, Kahneman et al. 
(1986) showed that individuals are more willing to accept company decisions that will otherwise be 
considered as unethical if the company attempts to compensate for losses than if it follows the same 
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action in order to increase its profits. There is some evidence that guilt could be perceived differently 
by men and women (Ludwig and Thoma, 2014), which could explain the strong gender difference that 
we observe for the framing. 
Our main finding seems relevant in several ways. First, it may help to identify circumstances 
under which people are more tempted to cheat. Indeed, when individuals are in a situation that is 
construed as a possible loss from a reference point (e.g., being fired, losing welfare benefits, or 
retaining a customer), they seem to be more likely to adopt unethical behaviors compared to a 
situation framed as a gain. For instance, if a person’s situation changes, and the change increases a 
person’s tax liability compared to the previous years, this person might be tempted to a greater extent 
to evade taxes than someone who is supposed to pay the same tax amount as in the preceding years. 
Second, if resources for monitoring are limited, ceteris paribus, it might be more efficient to 
target individuals who risk losing something rather than individuals who risk winning something. For 
instance, when looking at welfare fraud, our findings indicate that monitoring strategies should focus 
on those who are already beneficiaries and stand to lose parts of their benefits. In sports contests, anti-
doping authorities could focus their efforts slightly more on previous winners and record-holders that 
stand to lose their status or titles rather than on newcomers. Importantly, these are often cheating 
environments that are interactive; the level of monitoring is not completely exogenous but chosen by 
an authority. Hence, the results from our individual (non-interactive) working task have to be 
interpreted cautiously and cannot directly be applied to all relevant interactive situations. Furthermore, 
focusing monitoring efforts on specific groups might be perceived as unfair or inappropriate in some 
situations (e.g., ethnic profiling). 
Third, a natural implication of our result for decision makers is to devote enough attention to 
gain/loss perception and to potentially unintended effects from the framing. Consequently, an 
inexpensive policy (whenever available) with first-order effects on cheating would be to reframe 
situations in order to avoid loss framing. 
Our findings also point toward two additional interesting issues. A loss frame does not improve 
actual performance in our case, which means that principals seeking to improve performance of agents 
ought to be cautious in relying on loss frames as a performance-enhancing device, even in the absence 
of cheating opportunities. Second, gender differences are not trivial. Females seem to cheat to a lesser 
degree than males, even though cheating in the unmonitored performance conditions is still substantial 
among women, but they seem to be much less prone to the gain/loss framing differentials than men. 
Several extensions seem to present themselves as relevant for future research: For instance, it 
would be worthwhile analyzing whether the gain/loss difference in cheating is mainly driven by the 
perception of social norms depending on a reference point or by internalized reactions such as 
difference in feelings of guilt. There might even be other explanations for the observed difference that 
we could not cover in our non-interactive setting. Hence, extending our experimental design to a fully 
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interactive (game) environment could be interesting. Field experiments using gain/loss framing as a 
device to limit cheating would be another interesting opportunity. Finally, the large gender differences 
in the reaction to the gain/loss framing are surprising. If at all, one would have expected women to be 
more sensitive to the framing than men (as experimental results from decision making under risk seem 
to suggest that women tend to be more loss averse than men). We have only post hoc explanations for 
this finding, and it would be good to, first, have it substantiated in future research and, then, have its 
causes analyzed in greater detail. Obviously, it would be worthwhile to also look whether our main 
result is robust to different socio-cultural settings (see, e.g., Mann et al., 2014), even though there is no 
a priori reason to believe that our participants, French university students, are somewhat more 
particular than other cohorts of usual experimental participants in the experimental economics 
laboratories around the world. 
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Appendix (for online publication) 
Experimental instructions (translated from French; condition without monitoring and ex ante 
payment) 
 
Welcome! 
 
General information 
In this experiment you are asked to complete a simple task. When you entered the room, you received 
this instructions, an envelope containing 30 euros, and two others sheets of paper labeled TASK and 
RESULT. 
 
Please verify the amount of 30 euros in your envelope. 
 
If you succeed to complete the task, you can keep the 30 euros. Otherwise, the amount will be reduced 
according to your performance on this task. 
 
Your task 
You have 5 minutes to find, in each pair of the following 20 pairs of matrices, which two numbers add 
up to exactly 10 (one number from matrix 1 plus one number from matrix 2). 
 
Please circle the numbers that add up to 10 in each pair of matrices clearly. 
 
Earnings 
If you solve the task correctly for all 20 pairs of matrices, you can keep the 30 euros. 
 
Otherwise, for every unsolved/wrong pair, 1.5 euro will be subtracted from the 30 euros. For instance, 
if you solved correctly 14 pairs of matrices, and had 6 incorrect pairs of matrices, you will end up with 
30-6*1,5=21 euros instead of 30. 
 
Once the 5 minutes are finished, please report on the sheet RESULTS the number of correct answers 
you had. Substract the corresponding number of euros for the number of unsolved pairs of matrices 
from the envelope, keep the earned amount with you, and give back the envelope to the experimenter 
with the remaining money. Destroy your TASK sheet through the paper shredder in the back of the 
room. 
 
Give back to the monitor only your RESULT sheet and the remaining money. 
 
If you have any questions, please let us know. 
 
Good luck! 
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Examples for pairs of matrices (not provided in instructions) 
 
 
matrice  
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,11 5,97 4,36 
 
4,09 3,33 5,44 
5,02 4,84 4,37 
 
5,08 6,06 6,03 
5,26 4,61 5,6 
 
4,84 4,49 4,82 
4,71 5,46 5,98 
 
6,19 4,74 4,4 
 
 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,72 4,25 4,81 
 
3,88 6,05 5,89 
4 4,8 5,49 
 
6,3 4,89 4,71 
4,12 4,43 5,77 
 
6,58 5,27 4,83 
4,14 4,35 5,11 
 
5,46 6,45 5,9 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,12 5,29 4,99 
 
5,78 4,11 4,31 
4,73 4,65 4,28 
 
5,47 5,95 6,02 
4,03 4,07 4,94 
 
5,66 5,73 5,97 
5,56 5,17 4 
 
4,94 4,23 5,1 
 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,13 5,79 5,77 
 
6,17 4,31 4,3 
5,15 5,7 5,4 
 
5,45 4,66 4,4 
5,68 4,35 4,92 
 
3,82 5,45 4,58 
4,6 4,33 5,34 
 
5,9 6,37 3,96 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,47 5,63 5,9 
 
4,63 4,87 4,8 
5,39 5,24 4,44 
 
3,91 4,86 5,96 
4,56 4,84 4,69 
 
6,44 5,96 5,5 
4,07 4,79 4,4 
 
5,63 5,71 5,31 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
 
 
matrice 
2 
4,11 5,82 4,89 
 
4,15 3,98 5,01 
4 5,77 5,13 
 
5,7 4,83 5,37 
4,84 5,52 5,83 
 
4,96 4,78 4,27 
5,15 5,48 5,19 
 
5,89 4,92 4,01 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,72 4,26 4,16 
 
4,68 4,94 5,34 
4,12 5,15 4,18 
 
6,38 4,65 4,86 
5,12 4,32 4,16 
 
4,98 5,58 6,84 
4,04 5,64 5,83 
 
5,56 5,82 3,67 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,22 5,04 4,71 
 
5,18 4,76 5,39 
4,77 4,2 4,48 
 
5,73 6,6 4,72 
5,07 4,66 5,05 
 
4,13 4,84 5,85 
5,49 4,27 4,42 
 
5,11 5,03 6,48 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,32 4,77 5,45 
 
5,08 6,13 3,55 
5,6 5,31 5,25 
 
5,1 6,59 5,75 
5,67 4,21 5,84 
 
3,43 4,69 4,86 
4,74 4,67 4,7 
 
5,86 6,13 4,8 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,79 5,55 4,43 
 
3,91 4,25 6,47 
5,14 5,91 4,12 
 
5,66 4,39 6,28 
5,95 5,42 4,36 
 
3,95 5,08 5,63 
4,69 4,04 4,37 
 
4,81 5,06 5,91 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
 
 
matrice 
2 
5,41 4,71 5,88 
 
3,69 5,69 5,02 
5,16 5,87 4,44 
 
4,83 4,63 5,86 
5,64 5,17 5,19 
 
5,26 5,79 5,81 
4,38 4,33 4,62 
 
6,32 4,67 5,58 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,55 4,92 4,39 
 
3,85 6,08 4,91 
5,32 4,43 4,81 
 
4,78 6,57 4,37 
4,53 5,43 4,17 
 
6,27 5,17 6,43 
4,61 4,31 5,23 
 
5,79 5,89 5,19 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,86 5,14 4,49 
 
5,44 3,96 4,81 
5,96 5,95 5,56 
 
4,54 4,04 4,74 
5,64 5,17 5,17 
 
3,56 4,63 4,23 
4,63 4,17 4,21 
 
5,47 6,33 4,79 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,91 4,73 4,23 
 
4,29 4,5 4,97 
5,97 5,5 5,98 
 
4,63 4,57 3,92 
5,89 5,4 4,97 
 
5,01 5,1 5,23 
5,19 5,39 5,16 
 
5,01 3,71 5,14 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,08 4,74 5,52 
 
4,42 5,06 4,96 
4,29 4,39 5,04 
 
5,51 4,91 4,68 
4,85 4,32 4,38 
 
4,65 5,88 4,62 
4,6 4,92 5,9 
 
5,2 5,58 4,4 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
matrice 
1 
 
matrice 
2 
5,28 4,81 5,51 
 
5,12 5,16 3,79 
4,17 4,84 4,16 
 
5,43 5,17 5,74 
4,69 5,2 4,69 
 
5,11 5 5,01 
4,17 4,81 4,16 
 
5,43 5,69 5,74 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,99 5,88 5,74 
 
3,01 3,42 4,06 
5,19 5,05 5 
 
4,51 4,26 5,5 
4,39 5,84 5,22 
 
5,11 4,95 5,78 
5,53 5,87 5,75 
 
5,07 3,23 3,45 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
5,11 5,97 4,36 
 
4,09 3,33 5,44 
5,6 4,84 4,37 
 
5,08 6,06 6,03 
5,26 4,61 5,98 
 
4,84 4,49 4,82 
4,71 5,46 5,02 
 
6,19 4,74 4,4 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,88 5,96 4,8 
 
4,92 4,94 4,3 
5,75 4,85 5,78 
 
3,55 4,65 4,82 
4,57 4,39 4,87 
 
5,39 5,01 5,23 
4,51 5,18 4,71 
 
5,43 4,22 5,79 
 
 
 
matrice 
1 
   
matrice 
2 
 
4,22 4,74 5,04 
 
4,42 5,06 4,97 
4,29 4,39 5,52 
 
5,51 4,91 4,68 
4,85 4,32 5,9 
 
4,65 5,88 5,62 
4,6 4,92 4,38 
 
5,2 5,77 4,4 
 
